AssureAssure
AI agent authorization

AI agents can act. Humans should authorize.

Agents are moving from answering questions to taking actions. The question a business has to answer is no longer only who the customer is, but whether a real human approved what just happened.

How do you keep a human in control of what an AI agent does?

Let the agent handle the routine work, then return to a verified human at the moments that carry consequence — confirming identity, choosing between options, and authorizing payment. Each approval covers one specific action with its cost stated, instead of giving the agent standing credentials.

The problem

AI needs boundaries, not unlimited credentials.

Most agent integrations today work by handing software the customer's own access. That is convenient, and it is exactly the wrong shape.

Credentials are permanent

A stored credential keeps working long after the task it was granted for has finished, and it covers every action the customer could take.

Intent disappears

A logged-in session proves someone signed in at some point. It says nothing about whether the customer agreed to the specific action that followed.

Authorization is scoped

One action, one amount, one moment, with an expiry — small enough that both sides can say precisely what was agreed.

The framework

Identity. Intent. Authorization.

Three questions, in order, for any action an agent proposes on a customer's behalf.

Identity

Who is approving?

Establish that a real, known human is on the other end of the approval — not a session token an agent inherited.

Intent

What exactly is being proposed?

Show the specific action, its cost and its consequence in language the customer can check in a few seconds.

Authorization

Did the human agree to that consequence?

Capture explicit approval of that action, bound to that moment — not blanket permission for everything that follows.

AI can prepare the action. The human authorizes the consequence.

Trust model

Routine work runs free. Consequences come back.

An agent should not need permission to look something up. It should always need permission to commit the customer to something.

Checkpoint

Identity

Before an agent can read or change anything that belongs to a customer, confirm the human.

Checkpoint

Decision

When there is a real choice with real consequences, the human chooses — the agent prepares the options.

Checkpoint

Transaction

When money moves, the human authorizes that amount for that action. Nothing standing, nothing implied.

Walkthrough

One task, start to finish.

A customer asks their own agent to change a flight. Watch where the human stays in control.

Illustration — reference architecture. Not a live system.
HumanStep 1 of 12

The customer delegates a task

“Change my flight tomorrow. Keep me in the same cabin and don't spend more than $150.”

The itinerary, fare and amounts above are fictional sample data. No airline, brand or payment provider is represented, and this flow describes intended functionality that is not built today.

The trust boundary

Six actions that should never be automated away.

These are the boundary operations Assure is building toward. None are built today.

Authenticate

Prove the human behind the request.

Authorize

Capture approval of one specific action.

Pay

Confirm a payment without handing an agent card details.

Consent

Record what the customer agreed to share or allow.

Share

Release only the data the action actually needs.

Escalate

Hand off to a person with the context intact.

Agent-to-agent commerce

Two agents can negotiate. One human decides.

A conceptual architecture, not a shipping product.

Human→Personal AI agent↔Assure trust boundary↔Enterprise AI agent→CRM · service · commerce

An AI agent shouldn't need your credit card number to buy something for you.

Human fallback

Automation shouldn't mean losing the human.

When an agent reaches the end of what it should decide, the handoff has to carry everything a person needs to pick up the thread.

The authenticated identity
The original intent, in the customer's words
The constraints they set
What the agent already attempted
The option that was selected
Which approvals were captured
The payment state
Why it stopped
Future shape

What an authorization record could contain.

Described so your architects can plan against it. None of this exists as a shipping artifact today.

  • · Authenticated identity reference
  • · The requested action
  • · Authorization scope
  • · Timestamp
  • · Channel used
  • · Transaction context
  • · Session binding
  • · Expiration
  • · Verification metadata

No authorization artifact, cryptographic signing or verifiable receipt exists in the product today. Nothing on this page should be read as a shipping API, and no agent platform, payment provider or identity vendor partnership is claimed.

Where this really stands

Plain status, no hedging.

We would rather you plan around the truth than be surprised by it.

The verification experience

The opt-in and code walkthrough at /verify is a labelled simulation. No messages are sent.

Authentication foundations

Passkeys, one-time codes, step-up challenges and verified messaging are in development, not generally available.

Everything on this page

Agent authorization, scoped approval, transaction authorization and agent-to-agent commerce are reference architecture.

Frequently asked.

Agents do the work. Humans stay in control.

Authentication for today. Authorization for what's next.